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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-l 02(5), the Utah Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to hear this appeal in an order dated July 6, 2016. This was done pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a), which gives this Court appellate jurisdiction over a 
ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
II. GOVERNING CONSTRUCTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
A. UTAH CODE§ 31A-21-108. Subrogation actions. 
Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer in the name of its insured. 
B. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-3-107. Survival of action for injury or death 
to person. 
A cause of action arising out of personal injury to a person, or death caused 
by the wrongful act or negligence of another, does not abate upon the death 
of the wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured person, or the personal 
representatives or heirs of the person who died, has a cause of action 
against the wrongdoer or the personal representatives of the wrongdoer for 
special and general damages. 
C. Rule 17 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (in relevant part): 
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of 
the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, 
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract 
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute 
may sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose benefit 
the action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use 
or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No 
action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name 
of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after 
objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or 
substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or 
I 
I 
I 
i 
G,; 
substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced 
in the name of the real party in interest. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of additional facts. Appellee Wilson accepts Appellant Educators Mutual 
Insurance Association's (hereinafter "EMIA") statement of facts and adds the following 
facts: 
In 2011, Wilsons filed a wrongful death lawsuit as her heirs seeking compensation 
for their loss of Jessica's companionship and burial expenses. (No Personal 
Representative was sought or appointed for Jessica's estate.) R. at 4 78. 
In 2013, Wilsons reached a tentative settlement for the $100,000 limits of 
Krueger's liability insurance limits, subject to resolution of EMIA 's claim of a federal 
ERISA lien. R at 480. 
In January, 2014, EMIA filed its own competing suit against Krueger, the driver of 
the car which struck Jessica. In its Complaint, EMIA sued Krueger, alleging that his 
"failure to exercise reasonable care caused his vehicle to strike Jessica Wilson," causing 
her severe injuries and death. EMIA alleged that Krueger "is liable for all damages 
arising out of this action, including medical expenses incurred by Jessica Wilson, and 
claimed its insurance contract with Jessica Wilson gave it a right of reimbursement. R. at 
775, attached as Addendum D. EMIA did not pay all of Jessica Wilson's medical 
expenses. See payments ledger in Addendum D. 
Unable to resolve the competing claims, the parties stipulated to consolidation of 
2 
the two cases, an assignment of Krueger's defenses against the EMIA claim to Wilsons, 
and an interpleader of Krueger's $100,000 liability policy limits. R. at 263. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The substance of the holding of the Utah Court of Appeals is that, 
MIA should have brought its personal injury action in the name of the estate 
or intervened in the Wilsons' action against Krueger (citation omitted). 
Instead, it filed an action in its own name, which Utah law does not permit. 
Wilson, 2016 UT App 38 at 112,368 P.3d 471. 
The Court of Appeals correctly rejected the argument of EMIA - that Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-21-108, "Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer in the name of 
its insured," expressly authorized an insurer to sue in its own name. The court ruled there 
is "no language" in the statute "granting an insurance company the right to bring a 
subrogation action in its own name." Wilson, 2016 UT App 3 8, 1 8 (italics in original). 
The court also correctly presumed that § 31A-21-108 is not "the exclusive method" to 
bring a (subrogation) action. Id. 
EMIA and National Association of Subrogation Professionals (hereinafter 
"AMICUS") do not argue that the statute is ambiguous. AMICUS, in fact, reads the 
statute precisely that way the Court of Appeals reads it: "The plain meaning of Section 
3 lA-21-108 is obvious. An insurer may pursue a subrogation action in the insured's 
name." (AMICUS Brief, p. 9.) However, EMIA and AMICUS fault the court for not 
seeing that the plain meaning of statue permits the "insurer to sue in its own name." 
EMIA and AMICUS seem to argue that the statute must read that way because insurers 
3 
file subrogation cases. However, because the common law did not allow subrogation of 
injury or death claims, Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 107 Utah 114, 152 P.2d 98, 104 
( 1944 ), injury subrogation does not exist except in compliance with § 31A-21-108, "by 
the insurer in the name of its insured," Id. WILSONS' exhaustive search of Utah case law 
shows no reported case in Utah history in which an insurer sued a tortfeasor for injury 
damages in the name of the insurer. 
EMIA has cited to several cases in support of its argument that Utah Code Ann. § 
3 lA-21-108 authorizes an insurer to sue in its own name. None of these cases interprets 
§ 3 lA-21-108. And, none allows an insurer which has not paid the debt of the wrongdoer 
in full to sue the wrongdoer in its own name except for workers' compensation injuries 
which are governed by statutes which expressly give standing to workers' compensation 
insurer. See Wilson 2016 UT App 38, fn. 4 (quoting the current workers' compensation 
statute). 
The Court of Appeals is correct that Utah case law does not give an insurer a right 
to sue in its own name unless it has fully paid the damages for which the wrongdoer could 
be liable. This has been the law of Utah for over one hundred years, and is the general 
rule throughout the United States. In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Nat'/ Ins. Co., 
912 P2d 983 (Utah 1996) and other cases, the Utah appellate courts have described the 
conditions which allow and insurer to sue in its own name. EMIA failed to meet the 
condition which requires that "the entire debt must have been paid," referring to the debt 
4 
owed by the tortfeasor to the injured insured. Id. at 986. 
The Court of Appeals' opinion in this case does not leave insurers like EMIA and 
AMICUS without a remedy or protection. Nothing in Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, creates 
new law, and insurers like EMIA and AMICUS have the same rights they have had for 
decades. 
AMICUS misreads the Court of Appeals reading of the plain language of Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-21-108 as always requiring the insured to be made whole first. 
However, § 3 lA-21-108 does not require the insured to be made whole. The doctrine that 
an injured party should be made "made whole" before a subrogated insurer can recover 
on its claim was argued below, Wilson, 2016 UT App 38 at 1 5, but the issue was never 
reached because of the Court's ruling on EMIA 's standing. Id. at 1 7. This case is not a 
test of the made whole doctrine. 
EMIA and AMICUS misread Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108, as interpreted by the 
Court of Appeals, as preventing the insurer from protecting its rights by joining in a case. 
They err. The purpose of§ 31A-21-108 is to create "one action," not to prevent an insurer 
from protecting its rights. Neither § 31A-21-108 nor the Court of Appeals' opinion nor 
any other Utah case prevents an insurer from also appearing in the case. The Court of 
Appeals recognized the important right of an insurer to protect its rights by intervening in 
a case in its own name. Wilson, 2016 UT App 3 8 at 1 12. AMICUS has raised some 
important policy arguments that a property insurer should be able to protect its 
5 
subrogation rights in its own name. This essential right to join any case which may 
~ involve subrogation issues as an intervening party meets the needs EMIA and AMICUS 
describe. EMIA 's problem in this case is that for more than three years (see Statement of 
Facts) it ignored its right to intervene in the Wilson wrongful death case and then filed its 
own competing "action in its own name, which Utah law does not permit." Wilson, 2016 
UT App 38 at, 12. 
The Court of Appeals correctly applied Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107, Utah's 
survival statute for injury and death, which passed Jessica Wilson's cause of action 
against Krueger on her death to her estate personal representative and heirs. Th cause of 
action included the right to recover Jessica's medical expenses. 
Neither EMIA nor AMICUS address the applicability and meaning of § 78B-3-
l 07. Instead, they complain that the Court of Appeals deprived insurers of any rights 
when their insurer dies. They vaguely argue, without support, that the Court of Appeals 
should have applied Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108 to give the insurer the right to sue in 
its own name after the death of its insured. Neither EMIA nor AMICUS explain how the 
general authority to sue in the name of an insurer in § 31A-21-108 should control over the 
express provisions for survival of injury and death actions in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-
107. EMIA could have, but did not, protect its rights through participating through Jessica 
Wilson's estate or by intervening in the wrongful death action. "To entitle one to 
subrogation, the equities of one's case must be strong, as equity will, in general, relieve 
6 
only those who could not have relieved themselves." Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied 
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 890 P.2d l 029, 1031 (Utah 1995) (quoting Transamerica Ins. Co. 
v. Barnes, 505 P.2d 783, 786 (1972). 
Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure prevents dismissal of a case without 
giving a reasonable time for substitution of the real party in interest. This rule does not 
apply in this case. This is an interpleader case which arose from the settlement and 
dismissal of the parties' separate and competing cases against the tortfeaser, Krueger. 
When the Court of Appeals remanded "with instructions for the trial court to dismiss 
EMIA's claims and award all of the interpleaded funds to the Wilsons," the dismissal was 
because EMIA had lacked standing in the prior case it had filed against Krueger. Wilson, 
2016 UT App 38 aqJ 13. Without standing in the prior case, EMIA has no claim on the 
funds in this interpleader action. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. The Court of Appeals correctly interpreted§ 31A-21-108. Neither 
APPELLANT nor AMICUS nor Utah case law offers a different interpretation. 
Petitioner EMIA and AMICUS both fault the Utah Court of Appeals for 
incorrectly interpreting this fourteen word statute: "Subrogation actions may be brought 
by the insurer in the name of its insured." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108. (EMIA Brief. 
pp. 9-10; AMICUS Brief, p. 3.) 
The Utah Court of Appeals found "no language" in the statute " ... granting an 
7 
insurance company the right to bring a subrogation action in its own name." Wilson, 2016 
vii UT App 38,, 8 (italics in original). EMIA and AMICUS call this ruling "untenable." 
(EMIA Brief, p. 24; AMICUS Brief, p. 4.) AMICUS writes that the Court of Appeals 
"read words into the statute which simply do not exist," and the "clear language used in 
this statute without question should allow for an insurer to file suit in subrogation in its 
own name. There is simply no other reasonable way to interpret this statute." (AMICUS 
brief, p. 3.) 
Neither EMIA nor AMICUS argues that the statute is ambiguous, and neither 
offers a contrary interpretation. AMICUS, in fact, reads the statute precisely the way the 
Court of Appeals reads it: "The plain meaning of Section 31A-21-108 is obvious. An 
insurer may pursue a subrogation action in the insured's name." (AMICUS brief, p. 9, the 
agreeable conclusion of a well-researched, five-page argument.) 
Neither EMIA nor AMICUS has cited a single Utah case which interprets§ 3 lA-
21-108 differently. As the Court of Appeals and AMICUS agree, there is no language in § 
3 IA-21-108 granting an insurer the right to sue in its own name. 
EMIA argues for a different interpretation of§ 31A-21-108 "because the right for 
an insurer to subrogate already exists at common law." (EMIA Breif, p. 9.) This 
characterization of the common law is only partly correct. Common law allowed 
subrogation of property claims, but not claims for injury or death. In Utah " ... common 
law there was no right of subrogation in an insurance carrier against a third person for 
8 
personal injury or death of an insured." Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 107 Utah 114, 
152 P.2d 98, 104 (1944). This suggests that§ 31A-21-108 is the only authority for a 
subrogated insurer to sue the wrongdoer for personal injuries, and only in compliance 
with the statute, "by the insurer in the name of its insured." Id. WILSONS' exhaustive 
search of Utah case law shows no reported case in Utah history in which an insurer sued a 
tortfeasor for injury damages in the name of the insurer. 
The Court of Appeals assumed, correctly, that § 31-21-108 was not "the exclusive 
method" to bring a (subrogation) action. Wilson, 2016 UT App 38 at ,r 8. EMIA and 
AMICUS seem to agree. Their real arguments seem to lay elsewhere - that the law cannot 
mean what it says because an insurer must be able to file a subrogation action in its own 
name. The proper course for bringing a Utah subrogation action is discussed below. 
B. The Court of Appeals is correct that Utah case law does not give an 
insurer a right to sue in its own name unless it has fully paid the damages for which 
the wrongdoer could be liable. 
EMIA'S and AMICUS' criticism of the Court of Appeals is not supported by 
Utah case law. Utah law does allow an insurer to sue in its own name, but not in this case. 
1. Utah law does allow an insurer to bring a subrogation action in its own name 
but only under narrow conditions. As early as 1946, the Utah Supreme Court declared 
rules which will allow a subrogated insurer to sue in its own name. In Cook v. Cook, the 
Plaintiff paid the insurance premiums on a life insurance policy and claimed a 
9 
subrogation right to the proceeds. Cook v. Cook, 110 Utah 406,410 174 P. 2d 434 (1946). 
i4J In its analysis, the Court identified conditions which entitle a party claiming subrogation 
to sue in its own name. Id. at 410. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State Farm v. Northwestern National crystalized the 
factors identified in Cook into four elements: 
Before a court will grant relief in a subrogation action, a party must meet 
the following requirements: ( 1) There must be a debt or obligation for 
which the subrogee was not primarily liable; (2) the subrogee must have 
made payment to protect his own rights or interest; (3) the subrogee must 
not have acted merely as a volunteer; and (4) the entire debt must have been 
paid. Furthermore, subrogation must not work any injustice to the rights of 
others. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Nat'l Jns. Co., 912 P.2d 983,986 (Utah 1996). 
The fourth element of State Farm v. Northwestern National, that "the entire debt 
must have been paid," supports the Court of Appeals' opinion in this case as described in 
the next argument. 
2. The Court of Appeals was correct. EMIA did not meet the test for suing in its own 
name because, inter alia, it had not paid the entire debt of the wrongdoer. EMIA does not 
dispute that it paid only part (some of the medical expenses) of the debt the tortfeasor, 
Krueger, owed to Jessica Wilson, the decedent and insured. Jessica's estate could have 
asserted "special and general damages" to include: pain and suffering; additional medical 
expenses; burial and funeral expenses; and pain and suffering under Utah's survival statute 
for injury claims, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3- l 07. Having paid less than the tortfeasor owed 
10 
Jessica's estate, EMIA was not entitled to file the claim in its own name. The Court of 
Appeals wrote: 
Our review of Utah case law convinces us that, with the possible exception of 
an insurer who has fully indemnified the insured for all damages for which 
the wrongdoer could be held liable, see Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 
107 Utah 114, 152 P.2d 98, 103 (1944), no independent right exists for an 
insurer to seek subrogated damages in its own name. 
Wilson, 2016 UT App 38 at if 8. 
While the Court of Appeals did not cite Johanson for its holding (see discussion of 
EMIA'S criticism below), Johanson contains a good review of the general law - that an 
insurer must pay the debt of the wrongdoer in full before the insurer has standing to sue the 
wrongdoer directly. 
As quoted from the State Farm case above, "the entire debt must have been paid" by 
the subrogated insurer before the insurer could sue in its own name. State Farm, 912 P2d at 
986. Other Utah cases support this rule. See Cook discussed above; Davis County v. Jensen, 
2003 UT App 444, 83 P.3d 405, fn 5; and Featherstone v. Emerson 14 Utah 12, 45 Pac. 713 
( 1896) (" As a general rule, the right of subrogation cannot be enforced until the whole debt 
is paid or tendered to the creditor."). This has been the general American rule for over one 
hundred years. See Payment of entire claim of third person as condition of subrogation, 9 
A.LR. 1596 (1920). 
3. EMIA' S criticism of the Court of Appeals' reliance on Johanson v. Cudahy 
Packing Co. is unfair, and the case does not authorize EMIA's to sue a torfeasor in its own 
11 
name. In a lengthy criticism of the Court of Appeals' reliance on Johanson v. Cudahy 
Packing Co., EMIA tries to persuade this court that the Court of Appeals misapplied the 
holding in the case and that Johanson actually supports EMIA' S position in that it has 
standing in this case. (EMIA Brief, pp. 16-23.) 
EMIA'S criticism of the Court of Appeals is unfair. The Court of Appeals' citation 
was "see Johanson v. Cudahy .... " Wilson, 2016 UT App 38 at, 8. The "see" signal 
indicates that Johanson supports the proposition but does not directly state it. It is a signal 
that the Court was not relying on the holding. See Colombia Law Review, Harvard Law 
Review, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, and The Yale Law Journal, The Blue Book 
A Uniform System for Citation, 6, (Mary M. Prince ed., 19th ed. 2011 ). 
In its analysis of Johanson, EMIA missed a critical point: the insurer in Johanson 
had a statutory cause of action to sue in its own name. The additional facts below are 
necessary to understand Johanson. 
First, the cited 1944 opinion was the second appeal of the dispute, which had been 
re-filed between the two opinions. The decision on the first appeal in 1941 states its 
holding: "What this case decides is: The statutory cause of action in favor of the employer 
or the carrier granted by 42- 1- 58, R.S.U. 1933 may be assigned." Johanson v. Cudahy 
Packing Company, 101 Utah 219, 120 P.2d 281,282 (1941) (the citation to the Revised 
Statutes of Utah is to the workers compensation statute) (emphasis added). 
Second, EMIA 's argument (EMIA Brief, p. 22) that the employer and its insurer in 
12 
Johanson (1944) did not have statutory standing is wrong, as shown in the 1941 opinion. 
EMIA's misreading may come because the 1944 opinion quotes only portions of the statute 
which omit the statutory case of action language. The statutory cause of action in the old 
Utah statute was similar in substance to the present Utah workers compensation statute 
quoted in Wilson, 2016 UT App 38 at fn 4. 
Third, the Johanson ( 1944) court surveyed three primary views in the different states 
and rejected the view that the insured I injured party was the owner of the claim (EMIA 
Brief, p. 18) because the Utah workers compensation statute gave statutory standing to the 
insurer and employer. Johnson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98, 104 (Utah 1944). 
The Johanson (1944) survey of cases began with this preface, "Numerous cases from 
twenty-four jurisdictions are cited .... But when this right of subrogation was given by 
statute as it is in Section 42-1-58 ... " Id. ( emphasis added). 
The statutory standing of the employer's insurer in Johanson ( 1944) makes the 
case inapplicable to EMIA 's arguments for standing in this case. 
4. No Utah case supports the right of an insurer to sue the tortfeasor in the 
insurers' own name. The cases cited by EMIA do not support the right of an insurer to sue 
the tortfeasor in the insurers' own name. WILSONS make this bold claim: This case now 
before the Court, Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, 368 P .3d 4 71, is the first reported case in the 
history of Utah in which an insurer has sued a tortfeasor in its own name for subrogation 
of personal injury damages. 
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The cases cited by EMIA are these: 
Property damage case cited EMIA 
Nat'/ Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 44 Utah 26, 137 P. 653 (1913), 
cited by EMIA (EMIA Brief, p. 11, 12, 15, and 19) supports the Court of Appeals opinion 
in this case, and is no help to EMIA. In that case, a fire insurer paid $250 of $600 damage 
to barn and received assignment of claim against tortfeasor. In 1913 as now, Utah did not 
allow subrogation of only part of a claim. As the Utah Supreme Court wrote, "In all of the 
foregoing cases it is substantially held that an assignment of only a part of an entire 
claim ... is not enforceable by the assignee in an action at law." Id. at 654. However, the 
court affirmed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff insurer because the defendant failed to 
object {special demurrer) to standing in its answer to the partial claim assignment. Id. at 
658 
Workers compensation cases cited by EMIA 
Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., discussed above. 
Baker v. Wycoff, 19 P .2d 77 ( 193 8) cited by EMIA (EMIA Brief, p. 12 and 19) has 
no precedential value because it was another workers compensation case with the same 
statutory standing for the employer/ insurer reviewed in the discussion of Johanson 
above. 
Cases of insurer suing insurer cited by EMIA 
EMIA offers five cases to support its claim of standing to sue a tortfeasor in its 
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own name. These are: State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Nat'! Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983 
(Utah 1996) (EMIA Brief, p. 14 and 20); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997) (EMIA Brief, p. 15 and 20); Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied 
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1995) (EMIA Brief, p. 14); State Farm Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 450 P.2d 458 (Utah 1969) (EMIA Brief, p. 13, 14, 20, and 
21); and Nat'/ Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 377 P.2d 786 
(Utah 1963) (EMIA Brief, p. 21). 
These cases do not interpret Utah Code Ann.§ 3 lA-21-108, and they are not 
subrogated injury claims against a tortfeasor. Every one of these cases involve an insurer 
suing another insurer for contribution or for violation of subrogation liens. None are 
personal injury subrogation cases and none were filed against the tortfeasor. 
These cases exist because the Utah Supreme Court has carved out a special 
standing rule allowing insurers to sue other insurers. In State Farm v. Northwestern the 
Court wrote: 
More significantly, we have extended this principle (equitable subrogation) 
to an action by an insurer against a second insurance company which is 
primarily liable to defend or pay any claims on behalf of its insured but 
which has denied coverage. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty 
Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 14 Utah 2d 89, 377 P.2d 786, 787-88 (Utah 
1963). 
State Farm v. Northwestern, 912 P2d 983 at ,r 7. 
None of these cases apply to EMIA' S standing problem in this case. 
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Case of insurer suing recipient of its no-fault policy benefits cited by EMIA 
Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Barnes, 505 P .2d 783 (Utah 1972) (EMIA Brief, p. 
13 and 20). Barnes was a passenger in the car insured by Transamerica who collected 
medical benefits from Transamerica, not a tortfeasor who owed injury damages to its 
insured. Barnes settled with the tortfeasor driving another car without reimbursing 
Transamerica. Transamerica sued, alleging Barnes violated its subrogation rights by 
settling without notice to Transamerica. The case was remanded to decide if Barnes was 
made whole. The case does not support EMIA 's right to sue a tortfeasor with whom it has 
~ no relationship. 
5. Serious issues of claim preclusion and res judicata would also arise if an insurer 
is allowed to sue in its own name on part of the debt. A "single act causing simultaneous 
injury to the physical person and property of one individual ... give[s] rise to only one 
cause of action, and not to separate causes based ... on the personal injury, and ... the 
property loss." Allen v. Moyer, 2011 UT 44, if 16,259 P.3d 1049, quoting Raymer v. 
Hi-Line Transp., Inc., 15 Utah 2d 427,394 P.2d 383,384 (Utah 1964). Thus, 
adjudication of one the issues in an injury action will bar future actions on the same facts. 
Id. An insurer suing on medical expenses or property damage can prevent the insured 
from later suing for compensation for injuries. 
These issues are eliminated by requiring he insurer to sue in the name of its insured 
in a single action. 
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C. The Court of Appeals' opinion in this case does not leave insurers like 
EMIA and AMICUS without a remedy or protection. 
1. The Court of Appeals did not make new law. Nothing in Wilson, 2016 UT App 
38 creates new law. The Court interpreted Utah Code Ann.§ 31A-21-108 by its plain 
language. As described above in the discussion of Featherstone v. Emerson, the rule 
against splitting a cause of action by suing on part of the debt owed the insurer goes back 
more than a hundred years. Utah's survival statute for personal injury claims, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-3-l 07, is also very old. Nothing about this opinion is surprising. 
2. AMICUS misreads § 31A-21-108. as interpreted by the Court of Appeals, as 
always requiring the insured to be made whole first. AMICUS sees the issue here as 
"whether an insured must be made whole before that insured's insurance carrier has a 
right of subrogation." (AMICUS Brief, p. 2.) 
The doctrine that an injured party should be made "made whole" before a 
subrogated insurer can recover on its claim was argued below. Wilson, 2016 UT App 38 
at 1 5. However, the issue was never reached because of the Court's ruling on standing. 
Id. at 1 7. This case is not a test of the made whole doctrine. 
EMIA and AMICUS raise reasonable policy arguments - that in many property 
damage actions, requiring an insured to be made whole first would create problems for 
insurers. The cases cited by AMICUS are good illustrations of the problems facing 
property insurers. However, the Utah "made whole" requirement can be easily overcome 
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by property insurers. First, the right of an insured to be made whole can be modified in 
-.;;J the insurance contract. Birch v. Fire Ins. Exch., 2005 UT App 395, il 7, 122 P.3d 696. 
Second, the property insurer can become the assignee of the claim and sue in its own 
name. Nat'! Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 137 P. 653,655 (1913). In cases 
where the insured is owed a deductible or has small damages, the insured can pay the 
small deductible or otherwise receive an assigment of the cause of action and have 
standing in its own right. To prevent the problems of uncooperative insureds, the insured 
can also modify its insurance contract to provide for a purchase and assignment of the 
~ claim under predetermined terms. See Birch, 2005 UT App 395 at 17. 
Because the Utah Court of Appeals did not modify the law of subrogation, insurers 
still have the benefits and protections they have been given in scores of Utah appellate 
opinions. 
3. EMIA and AMICUS misread§ 3 lA-21-108, as interpreted by the Court of 
Appeals, as preventing the insurer from protecting its rights by joining in a case. The 
purpose of§ 31A-21-108 is to create "one action," not prevent insurers form protecting 
their rights. 
EMIA and AMICUS argue they should be able to sue in their own name as 
insurers to protect their rights. As AMICUS writes, " an insurer should have the ability to 
file suit in its name (and not exclusively in the name of its policy holder) in litigation 
against responsible third parties." (AMICUS Brief, p. 2.) They blame their perceived loss 
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of this ability on the Court of Appeals interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108. 
The short answer to these arguments is that neither the Court of Appeals opinion 
nor the plain meaning of § 31A-21-108 requires the policy holder to be the exclusive 
party in a case. 
The purpose of§ 31 A-21-108 is to create "one action," not prevent the insurer 
from also becoming a party with its insured. The strong policy § 31A-21-108 is to 
prevent the splitting of a cause of action, not to exclude an insurer from participating in 
the case. In Johanson v. Cudahay (1944), this court explained the reason for the rule 
requiring subrogation cases to be brought in the name of the insured. 
These cases proceed upon the theory that the insured is the trustee for the 
insurer and that the third party has a right not to have the cause of action 
against him split up so that he is compelled to defend two or more actions. 
This splitting of the cause of action is avoided by having the suit brought in 
the name of the insured for the benefit of himself and as trustee for the 
insurance carrier. The principle of law is noted in Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. 
v. D. & R. G. R. Co., supra, 44 Utah 26, 137 P. 653. 
Johanson, 152 P .2d at 104. 
4. Neither§ 3 lA-21-108 nor the Court of Appeals opinion nor any other Utah case 
prevents an insurer from also appearing in the case. 
The Court of Appeals recognized the important right of an insurer to protect its 
rights by joining in a case its own name. "EMIA should have brought its personal injury 
action in the name of the estate or intervened in the W ilsons' action against Krueger. 
Instead, it filed an action in its own name, which Utah law does not permit." Wilson, 
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2016 UT App 38 at 112. 
AMICUS illustrates its arguments by including its Complaint in AGCS Marine Ins. 
Co. v. Adler Hot Oil Serv. Inc., No. 150800020 (Utah 8th Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 26, 2015) 
(AMICUS Brief, p. 15, 27, 29 and Addendum D.) 
This case, in which AMICUS is trying to protect iself by appearing in this case, is 
a property loss case which appears to include all of the insured property owners as well as 
their insurers as plaintiffs. If so, WILSONS see no issue here. If an insurer can intervene 
in a case, WILSONS see no reason why the insurer cannot join its insured as an initial 
plaintiff. The joinder of insureds and insurers protects all, and meets the purpose of Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-21-108 by not splitting the cause of action into multiple suits on the 
same event and facts. 
5. The holding of the Court of Appeals was narrow: EMIA could not filed its own 
separate case and competing case in its own name on the same allegations of negligent 
driving by Krueger. 
The holding of the Court of Appeals was that EMIA had no right to file a separate 
and competing action against the tortfeasor, Krueger, for negligent driving when a 
separate action was already pending on the same facts. Wilson, 2016 UT App 38 at 112. 
(For a more complete description of EMIA 's competting injury claim against Krueger see 
Statement of Facts, and Addendum B.) Although the cases were consolidated for trial, the 
cases remained separate because EMIA never sought to make itself a party in WILSONS' 
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case. "Except where provided by statute, a consolidation in equity does not merge the 
suits and they maintain their separate identity in so far as the parties, issues, and proof are 
concerned." Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P .2d 287, 291 (Utah 1992), quoting 1 A C.J.S. Actions 
§ 217, at 690 (1985). 
The path for EMIA to protect its rights was clear. 
D. The court of appeals correctly applied§ 788-3-107 in ruling that 
Jessica Wilson's cause of action against the tortfeasor passed upon her death to her 
estate personal representative or heirs. 
EMIA writes that the "Court of Appeals has created a requirement that would 
make it impossible for an insurer to recover in instances where an insured passes away." 
(EMIA Brief, p. 24.) No, the Utah Legislature created the requirement decades ago. 
1. Actio persona/is moritur cum persona: injury causes of action die with the 
person. Under common law, injury causes of action were personal and did not outlive the 
injured person. Mason v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 7 Utah 77, 24 P. 796 (1890). "At common 
law, personal tort actions abate upon the death of either the claimant or the tortfeasor, 
while tort claims for property damage or conversion survive." Gressman v. State, 2013 
UT 63, 17, 323 P.3d 998. 
2. Without§ 78B-3-107, all causes of action for Jessica Wilson's injury and death 
would have died with her. 
Survival of personal tort actions is strictly under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107 
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which reads: 
A cause of action arising out of personal injury to a person, or death caused 
by the wrongful act or negligence of another, does not abate upon the death 
of the wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured person, or the personal 
representatives or heirs of the person who died, has a cause of action 
against the wrongdoer or the personal representatives of the wrongdoer for 
special and general damages. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-3-107(1)(a) (first enacted as U.C.A. 1953, §78-11-12). 
3. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the right to recover pre-death 
medical expenses passes under§ 78B-3-107(1 )(a) to the heirs and personal representative 
on death. "After Jessica's death, her cause of action for personal injury passed to her 
estate by virtue of Utah's survival statute. See Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-3-107(1)(a). "The 
survival statute grants the personal representatives or heirs of the injured decedent the 
right to pursue both "special and general damages" against the wrongdoer. General 
damages include damages for the insured's pain and suffering .... " Wilson, 2016 UT App 
38 at 112. "Pre-death medical expenses are part of an injury claim." Morrison v. Perry, 
140 P.2d 772 (Utah 1943). 
WILSONS' wrongful death suit was filed in 2011 (Statement of Facts). The parties 
in that case reached a tentative settlement in 2013 for a payment of $100,000. In 2014, 
EMIA rushed to file its competing Complaint against the tortfeasor, Krueger, for 
negligent driving on the same allegations which had been pending for three years. 
As the Court of Appeals wrote, EMIA had the right to either seek the appointment 
of a Personal Representative or intervene in the WILSONS case. Wilson, 2016 UT App 
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38at,rl2. 
EMIA failed for three years to join the WILSON case when it had a legal right to 
do so. "To entitle one to subrogation, the equities of one's case must be strong, as equity 
will, in general, relieve only those who could not have relieved themselves." Educators 
Mut., 890 P.2d at 1031 (quoting Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 505 P.2d 783, 786 
(1972). 
4. By its express terms,§ 78B-3-107(l)(a) applies only to personal injury, not 
to property claims. Unlike personal injury claims, property claims survived the death of 
the insured under common law. Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63, ,r 7 As described above, 
a subrogated insurer of a property damage claim can obtain an assigment of the claim, 
and can pursue legal action as the owner of the claim even after the death of the insured. 
Even without an assignment, a subrogated insurer of a property claim for which it paid 
the whole debt could also qualify to sue in its own name, even after the death of the 
insured, meeting the requirements given in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Nat'l 
Ins. Co., 912 P2d at 986. 
E. URCP 17 has no application. Because of the interpleader nature of this 
case, there is no ongoing litigation for the real party in interest to pursue. 
The pertinent part of Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads: 
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the 
name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed 
after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder 
or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or 
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substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced 
in the name of the real party in interest. 
1. The case in which the Court of Appeals found EMIA to have no standing was 
the case it filed against Krueger, which was dismissed. That case was settled and 
dismissed, and the settlement funds were placed in this interpleader case. The Court of 
Appeals needed to resolve standing in that case to determine the interpleader rights 
between EMIA and the WILSONS in this case. 
EMIA has standing in this interpleader case to litigate its right to the interpleader 
funds, but the Court of Appeals directed the trial court to dismiss EMIA from the 
interpleader action because it lacked standing in the case it filed against Krueger. 
2. The right to have the real party in interest in the EMIA case belonged to 
Krueger, the defendant in the EMIA case. The right did not belong to the Plaintiff who 
lacked the standing. The right to have the real party in interest substituted into an action 
belongs to the defendant in the action. Shurtleffv. Jay Tuft and Co., 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 
1980). Because the parties settled and dismissed the case against the tortfeasor, Krueger 
(EMIA, Statement of the Case), there is no ongoing litigation for the real party in interest 
to pursue and no defendant to protect. 
3. EMIA had a reasonable time in its case against Krueger. EMIA had more than 
"a reasonable time after objection" (URCP 17(a)) to substitute the real party in interest in 
the trial court. In his pre-answer motion to dismiss the case of EMIA v. Krueger. On 
February 22, 2011, the tortfeasor Krueger first objected to EMIA's standing. R. at 24. 
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Standing continued to be contested until the case was dismissed in 2014. See Order 
Regarding Allocation, February 6, 2015; R. at 844. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Court should affinn the ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~ day of November, 2016. 
HELGESEN, HOUTZ & JONES, P.C. 
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SENIOR JUDGE p AMELA T. GREENWOOD authored this Opinion, in 
which JUDGES MICHELE M. CHlusrIANSEN and KATE A. TOOMEY 
concurred.1 
GREENWOOD, Senior Judge: 
,r1 Everett P. Wilson Jr. and Darla Wilson appeal the trial 
court's order awarding a portion of interpleaded funds to 
Educators Mutual Insurance Association (EMIA). We reverse 
and remand. 
1. Senior Judge Pamela T. Greenwood sat by special assignment 
as authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11--
201(6). 
Wilson v. Educators Mutual Insurance 
BACKGROUND 
«j[2 On September 19, 2010, the Wilsons' daughter, Jessica, 
was killed after having been struck by a vehicle driven by Cade 
Krueger. EMIA, Jessica's insurer, paid nearly $79,000 in medical 
expenses on her behaH. No personal representative was sought 
or appointed for Jessica's estate. 
«JI3 The Wilsons filed a wrongful death claim against Krueger 
on January 12, 2011, seeking damages for the loss, love, and 
affection of their daughter and for funeral expenses. After 
several years of discovery and litigation, the Wilsons reached a 
tentative settlement with Krueger's insurer for the $100,000 limit 
on his insurance policy. 
CJI4 On January 22, 2014, EMIA filed a "Complaint for 
Subrogation Qaim" against Krueger, seeking reimbursement for 
medical expenses it had paid on Jessica's behalf, with accrued 
interest.2 EMIA asserted its subrogation claim pursuant to the 
terms of its insurance contract with Jessica. All parties agreed to 
consolidate the cases, and Krueger filed an interpleader 
counterclaim against both the Wilsons and EMIA, in which his 
insurer agreed to interplead the $100,000 policy limit with the 
court. EMIA and the Wilsons agreed to accept the $100,000 in 
settlement of their claims against Krueger but disagreed as to 
how the funds should be distributed. EMIA and the Wilsons 
agreed to dismiss Krueger from the lawsuit with prejudice. The 
trial court ordered Krueger's insurer to deposit the $100,000 with 
the court and gave the parties the opportunity to file briefs in 
support of their competing claims to the funds. 
2. EMIA had initially asserted a lien against the Wilsons' 
wrongful death claim but later acknowledged that it could not 
assert such a lien "against payments to the heirs of a deceased on 
a wrongful death claim." 
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,rs The Wilsons asserted that they were entitled to the entire 
$100,000 settlement. They raised a number of arguments in 
support of this position, including that they have "superior 
equity" over a subrogated insurer and are therefore entitled to 
be "made whole" before the insurer is paid, that EMIA had no 
legal right to pursue a cause of action against Krueger in its own 
name, and that E:MIA's action was barred by a three-year statute 
of limitations. 
CJI6 The trial court ultimately rejected the Wilsons' arguments 
and divided the settlement money equally between the Wilsons 
and E:MIA after finding that each party had incurred damages in 
excess of $100,000. However, in acknowledgment that the 
Wilsons' efforts to obtain the settlement had been 
disproportionate to those of EMIA, the trial court determined 
that the Wilsons were entitled to $25,817.69 of E:MIA' s award to 
reimburse them for a portion of their attorney fees. Accordingly, 
the trial court awarded $75,817.69 to the Wilsons and $24,182.31 
to EMIA. The Wilsons now appeal. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
17 The Wilsons raise a number of arguments in support of 
their assertion that the trial court erred in awarding BMIA a 
portion of the settlement. Because we agree with the Wilsons 
that E:MIA lacked standing to bring a subrogation action in its 
own name rather than in the name of Jessica or Jessica's estate, 
we do not address the Wilsons' other arguments. As this 
question involves the interpretation of a statute, as well as 
decisional precedents, we review the trial court's ruling for 
correctness. See MacFarlane v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2006 UT 25, 
,r 9, 134 P.3d 1116 (" A matter of statutory interpretation [is] a 
question of law that we review on appeal for correctness." 
(alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)); In re Adoption of A.F.K., 2009 UT App 198, ,r 16, 216 
P .3d 980 ( explaining that "issues that require interpretation of 
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prior decisional precedents" are 11 questions of law that are 
reviewed for correctness" ( citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
ANALYSIS 
,rs Utah's subrogation statute provides, "Subrogation actions 
may be brought by the insurer in the name of its insured." Utah 
Code Ann.§ 31A-21-108 (LexisNexis 2014). EMIA asserts that the 
use of the word "may" implies that the insurer may bring the 
action in the name of the insured but is not required to do so and 
may instead choose to bring the action in its own name. See State 
v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 978 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("[T]he term 
1may' is generally construed to be permissive and not mandatory 
.... " (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We 
assume, without deciding, that the statute's use of the 
permissive "may" allows for the possibility that bringing an 
action in the name of the insured is not the exclusive manner for 
an insurer to pursue a subrogation claim.3 Nevertheless, the 
3. Though we assume for purposes of our analysis that the 
permissive "may" applies to the manner in which the insurer 
brings the action, i.e., in its own name or in the name of another, 
we recognize that the legislature may have intended the word 
"may" to grant the insurer discretion only as to whether to bring 
the action at all. Cf. Thorpe v. Washington City, 2010 UT App 297, 
,r,r 23-24, 243 P.3d 500 (rejecting the assertion that language 
providing that "[a] final action or order of [a municipal 
employee] appeal board may be appealed to the Court of 
Appeals" could be interpreted as permitting a party to appeal in 
another venue, explaining that the language "is not permissive 
in the sense that the employee may seek review in the court of 
appeals if he likes but may complain in some other judicial 
venue if he prefers" but that, "[o]n the contrary, the statute is 
(continued ... ) 
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statute contains no language granting an insurance company the 
right to bring a subrogation action in its own name.4 So even 
assuming that bringing an action in the name of the insured is 
not, statutorily, the exclusive method for bringing suit, there 
must be some legal basis, apart from the statute as currently 
written, authorizing the insurer to bring the action in its own 
name. Cf. Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525, 528 (Utah 1976) 
(providing that permissive language in a statute "does not 
foreclose the right of a person" to pursue a remedy ''by any 
other means provided by law" (emphasis added)). Our review of 
Utah case law convinces us that, with the possible exception of 
an insurer who has fully indemnified the insured for all 
damages for which the wrongdoer could be held liable, see 
Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98, 103 (Utah 1944), no 
( ... continued) 
clear that the only court to which the employee may seek initial 
recourse .•. is the Utah Court of Appeals" (first alteration in 
original)). 
4. Conversely, the legislature has expressly granted insurers 
seeking reimbursement for the payment of workers' 
compensation benefits the authority to bring such actions in their 
own names: 
If compensation is claimed and the employer or 
insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay 
compensation, the employer or insurance carrier: 
(i) shall become trustee of the cause of action 
against the third party; and 
(ii) may bring and maintain the action either in its 
own name or in the name of the injured employee, 
or the employee's heirs or the personal 
representative of the deceased. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 34A-2-106(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2011) (emphasis 
added). 
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independent · right exists for an insurer to seek subrogated 
damages in its own name. 
19 First, EMIA does not have a direct cause of action against 
Krueger. "An insurer's subrogation right to recover from a 
responsible third party the amount the insurer paid to or on 
behalf of its insured derives from the insurance contract between 
the insurer and the insured," and its causes of action against that 
third party are limited 11to those rights or causes of action that 
the insured possesses against the third party." Bakowski v. 
Mountain States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62, ,r 23, 52 P.3d 1179. "[E]ven 
though the insurance company is subrogated to a part of the 
claim of the plaintiff, against the defendant, that does not aeate 
another cause of action and there can only be one suit to recover 
on that cause of action." Cederloff v. Whited, 169 P.2d 777, 780 
(Utah 1946). 
,r10 Further, "it has been generally held that a suit at law to 
enforce [a] right of subrogation must, at common law, be 
brought in the name of the insured, rather than by the insurance 
company in its own name and right." Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104 
( citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Utah R. 
Civ. P. 17(a) ("Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of 
the real party in interest .... [A] party authorized by statute may 
sue in that person's name .... "). ''The reason for the rule is that 
the wrongful act" of the third party being sued "is single and 
indivisible, and gives rise to but one liability." Johan.son, 152 P.2d 
at 103. Permitting an insurer to sue in its own name, except 
where it has fully indemnified the insured, could compel the 
wrongdoer to "defend a multitude of suits" against multiple 
insurance companies, the insured, and/or the insured' s 
dependents or heirs. Id. 
CJ[ll Furthermore, "[c]onsiderations of reason and policy impel 
the conclusion that the plaintiff, the one who has suffered the 
injury and damage, should have basic ownership and control of 
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his cause of action." Lanier v. Pyne, 508 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1973). 
Even under statutory schemes that give the insurance carrier's 
right to reimbursement priority over the injured party's right to 
damages,5 our supreme court has concluded "that the rights 
conferred upon the insurance carrier'' to pursue an action 
against a third party "should be regarded as secondary to the 
plaintiffs interest" in controlling the cause of action. Id. Thus, at 
least where the insured or the insured' s estate retains some 
interest in the potential damages, an insurance company cannot 
pursue a subrogation action in its own name. 
,r12 After Jessica's death, her cause of action for personal 
injury passed to her estate by virtue of Utah's survival statute. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78B .. 3-107(1)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015) 
(
11 A cause of action arising out of personal injury to a person, or 
death caused by the wrongful act or negligence of a wrongdoer, 
does not abate upon the death of the ... injured person .... [T]he 
personal representatives or heirs of the person who died, [have] 
a cause of action against the wrongdoer .... "). The survival 
statute grants the personal representatives or heirs of the injured 
decedent the right to pursue both "special and general damages" 
5. In subrogation actions where the insurer has paid workers' 
compensation benefits, such as in Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 
152 P.2d 98 (Utah 1944), and Lanier v. Pyne, 508 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 
1973), the Workers' Compensation Act expressly provides that 
the insurer is to be reimbursed before the employee or the 
employee's heirs. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5); see also 
Anderson v. United Parcel Serv., 2004 UT 57, ,rn 8-13, 96 P.3d 903. 
But in a case such as this, where the expenses paid by the insurer 
were not connected to a workers' compensation claim, "in the 
absence of express terms to the contrary, the insured must be 
made whole before the insurer is entitled to be reimbursed from 
a recovery from the third-party tort-feasor." Hill v. State Fann 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 8641 866 (Utah 1988). 
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against the wrongdoer. Id. General damages include damages 
for the insured's pain and suffering, Balderas v. Starks, 2006 UT 
App 218, ,r 16 n.5, 138 P.3d 75, which would have been separate 
from the medical expenses paid by EMIA on Jessica's behalf. 
Since Jessica's estate would presumably have been entitled to at 
least some portion of the damages recoverable in a personal 
injury action, EMIA should have brought its personal injury 
action in the name of the estate or intervened in the Wilsons' 
action against Krueger.' Instead, it filed an action in its own 
name, which Utah law does not permit. Because EMIA lacked 
standing to pursue a claim against Krueger in its own name, the 
trial court erred in awarding EMIA a portion of the interpleaded 
funds. 
CONCLUSION 
,I13 We conclude that EMIA lacked standing to pursue a 
subrogation action against Krueger in its own name. Thus, the 
trial court erred in dividing the Wilsons' settlement with EMIA. 
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand with 
instructions for the trial court to dismiss EMIA' s claims and 
award all of the interpleaded funds to the Wilsons. 
6. EMIA asserts that the correct approach would be to allow the 
insurer and the heirs to pursue separate claims to recover their 
respective shares of damages arising from a personal injury 
claim. Such an approach would unnecessarily subject the 
defendant to multiple suits for the same conduct, see Johanson, 
152 P.2d at 103, and potentially compromise the heirs' superior 
right to recover their share of the personal injury claim, see Hill, 
765 P.2d at 866. See Cederloff v. Whited, 169 P.2d 777, 780 (Utah 
1946). 
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IN AND POB. UTAH COUN'IY, STATS OP UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo Utah 84601 
. BDUCATOBS MUTUAL INSURANCB 
ASSOCIATION, COMPLAINT FOR SUBROGATION 
PJaintift 
vs. 
CADB M. ntJBGBR, an individuil; and 
John Does l through 100, 
Def',mdantl. 
CLAIM 
Civil No. ____ _ 
Judge ____ _ 
(Tier two) 
COMBS NOW the Plaintiff; Educators Mutual Insurance Association (BMIA);by and 
through its COUDS8l, Smart, Schofield, Shorter&. Lmcefont, a Pmfessional Corporation, and 
complains agajnst Defendants, Cade M. ICrueger, an individual, and John Does 1-100 as follows: 
1 
. . 
000775 
PARTIES, JIJRISDICTJON AND VENUE 
1. This Complaint involves "demand for reimbursement of medical expenses paid 
. . 
by the PJaintiff on behalf of Jessica Wilson, as a result of an automobile/pedeslrian accident, 
which occuued in Provo, Utah County, State of Utah. 
2. . PJefnti~ 13ducators Mutual lmurance Association ("Plaintiff"), is a licensed 
Insurance Company qualitied to do business in tho State of Utah. 
3. Upon lnfonnatlon and belie( Defendant Cade M. Kmeger, ("Defendant") is a 
resident ofUtah Cqunty, State of Utah. 
4. The 1me names and capacltlea of Defendants ~ohn Does 1 through 100, whether 
. . 
individual. corporatu, associate or otherwise, me as yet unidentified and unascertalned by 
. 
PlaintHt who therefbre sues said Defeadants 1>y such fictitious names, and will uk lea~ to 
. . 
amend this complaint to show these Deftmclants1 true names and capacities when the same have 
been identified and ascertained. 
S. 1he Comthasjurisc1ictionpumuantto Utah Code Annotated §78A-S-102. 
· 6. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78B-3-307. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS AND CAUSE OP ACl'ION 
7. 
8. 
PJaintfff realleges and incmporates herein by reference paragriphs .1-6 above. 
On or about September 19, 2010, Jessica W-llson was walking In a orosswa1k on 
. 
tho campus ofBdgham Young University when she was struc~ by a car driven by the Defendant. 
9. Defendant's failure to exercise reasonable care caused his vehicle to strike Jesmca . 
W-dson. 
2 
ooons 
10. Jessica Wilson was sevaely injured as a result of being struck by Defendant's car 
and later passed away. 
11. This accident was the proximate result of Defendants negligent ddving. 
12. Defendant is ~le for all damages arising out of this action. including medical 
expense mcurred by Jessica W'dson. 
13. At the time of the accident Jessica Wilson was insured tbrovgh PJaintJ1f for 
medical expenses. 
14. Plahdiff's medical plan. with .Jessica W'llson, which was in efCect at the time of 
this accident with Defendant, Included, under its subrogation and reimbursement seoti~ the 
following: 
When the Plm Sponsor has advanced payment of benefits to or on behalf 
of a Covered Person for bodily injury actionable at law or for which the 
Covered Person may obtain a recovery :limn a third party" the Plan 
aqgpims both the dgbt of Sulpgatlgn agafast the t1md narlY and a dght of 
reimbursement agaimtt.he Covered Person. [emphasis added]. In such 
sltwdions, the Covered Person has the following obligations: 
• 1he Covered Person must reimburse the Plan, up to the amount of 
such benefits advanced or paid by the Plan, out of any recovery 
obtained by the Covered Person from the third party (or such 
. partf s liability insurance) by judgment, settlement or otherwise, 
whether or not the Covered Person is or has been made whole. 
Tlie Plan is entitled to the first dollar of any recovery by the 
Covered Person and each dollar thereder up to the amount of 
benefits advanced or pal.cl by the Plan for the injuries to the 
.Covered Person that were caused by the third party. · 
• The Covered Person cannot limit or avoid such reimbursement 
obligation to the Plan by ·any agreement with the third party or any 
assignment or designation of such proceeds. 
3 
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, 
• The ·covered Pmon must not release or discharge pny claims that 
the Covered Person may have against any potentially responsible 
parties without written pmmlssion from the Pl&11. 
• The Covered Person must 1blly cooperation with the Plan Sponsor 
and lducaton. (mcludln& but not limited to, executing all required 
instrumems and papers), ff the Plan chooses to pursue its own right 
of Subrpptlon apia,t the third party; the Plan's right of 
Spmqptipn ht lfmitpd to the amount of benefits adyanced or paid 
by the Plan tg or on hebplf of the CgyeredPenon as aJeSUJt of the 
fault ofthe thhd R, and the Pian•s right to recover such benefits 
from the1blrct Rarlf does not depend gop, whetJ,,r the Cgyered 
Person is m@dewhole hy any recovery. [emphasis added.] 
15. In the medical policy between Plaintiff and Jessica Wilson_ Plaintiff is listed as 
the Plan's apmsor and Jessica Wllson is the Covered Person. 
16. As a result of the automobile accident caused by Defendant, .,laintiff bas paid 
medical expenses on behalf of Jessica Wilson in the amount of $78,692.34. (See payment 
history, a copy of which is atlached hereto and incmporated by reference as Bxbibit "A"). 
. . 
17. · As a result of the medical payments by Plaintitf on behalf of Jessica Wilson, 
Plainti1f is mtitle4 to recover from DP&ndant the amount of $78,692.34. 
WBBRBPORB, Plaintiff; l!ducators Mutual Insurance Association, prays for judgment 
against Defendant, Cade M. ICmeger, ~the following: 
1. An awant of judgment in the amount of $78,692.34; 
2. Interest on speciq1 damages. as allowed, both pre-judgment and post-judgment; 
3. Costs incurred in connection with the bringing.of this action; and 
4. Any other relief this Comt deems reasonable and proper Jn tbis matter. 
4 
000778 
DATED this 22nd day of January, 2014. 
. . 
PJaintjff'§ Addgess: 
852 P.astAri'owhead Lane 
Munay, Utah 84107 
Smart, Schofield, Shorter & Lunceford 
~ Professional Corporation 
. ~f.-~ 
Ran R. Smart . 
Jeffrey~ Callister . 
Attomeys for Plaintiff · 
.s 
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ADDENDUMC 
§ 31A-21-108. Subrogation actions, UT ST§ 31A-21-108 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 31a. Insurance Code 
Chapter 21. Insurance Contracts in General 
Pat1 t. General Rules 
U.C.A. 1953 § 31.A-21-108 
§ 31A-21-108. Subrogation actions 
Currentness 
Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer in the name of its insured. 
Credits 
Laws 1986, c. 204, § 141. 
Notes of Decisions ( 15) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 31A-21-108, UT ST§ 31A-21-108 
Current through 2016 Third Special Session 
Fut! ol l )unmwnt 
WESTU\Vv 
§ 788-3·107. Survival of action for injury or death to person, ...• UT ST§ 788-3-107 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78b. Judicial Code 
Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
Part 1. Actions--Right to Sue and be Sued 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-3-107 
Formerly cited as UT ST §78-11-12 
§ 78B-3-107. Survival of action for injury or death to person, upon death of 
\\Tongdoer or injured person--Exception and restriction to out-of-pocket expenses 
Currentness 
( l)(a) A cause of action arising out of personal injury to a person, or death caused by the wrongful acl or negligence 
of a wrongdoer, does not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured person, or the 
personal representatives or heirs of the person who died. has a cause of action against the wrongdoer or the personal 
representatives of the wrongdoer for special and general damages. subject to Subsection (l)(b). 
(b} If, prior to judgment or settlement, the injured person dies as a result of a cause other than the injury received as 
a result of the wrongful act or negligence of the wrongdoer, the personal representatives or heirs of the person have a 
cause of action against the wrongdoer or persona) representatives of the wrongdoer for special and general damages 
which resulted from the injury caused by the wrongdoer and which occurred prior to death of the injured party from 
the unrelated cause. 
{c) If the death of the injured party from an unrelated cause occurs more than six months after the incident giving rise 
to the claim for damages, the claim shall be limited to special damages unless. prior to the injured party's death: 
(i) written notice of intent to hold the wrongdoer responsible has been mailed to or served upon the wrongdoer or 
the wrongdoer's insurance carrier or the uninsured motorist carrier of the injured party, and proof of mailing or 
service can be produced upon request; or 
(ii) a claim for damages against the wrongdoer or against the uninsured motorist carrier of the injured party is the 
subject of ongoing negotiations between the parties or persons representing the parties or their insurers. 
(d) A subsequent claim against an underinsured motorist carrier for which the injured party was a covered person is 
not subject to the notice requirement described in Subsection {l)(c). 
(e) In no event shall an award of general damages available under the circumstances described in Subsection (l)(b) or 
( J )( c) against any wrongdoer or any insurer exceed S 100,000 regardless of availablc liability, uninsured or underinsured 
motor vehicle coverage. 
(2) Under Subsection (I) neither the injured person nor the personal representatives or heirs of the person who dies may 
recover judgment except upon competent satisfactory evidence other than the testimony of the injured person. 
i 
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@ 
§ 78B-3-107. Survival of action for injury or death to person, ... , UT ST§ 78B-3-107 
(3) This section may not be construed to be retroactive. 
Credits 
Laws 2008. c. 3. § 683~ eIT. Feb. 7. 2008; Laws 2009. c. 293, § I. eff. May 12, 2009; Laws 2014. c. 220~ § 1. eff. May 13. 
2014; Laws 2015, c. 382. § l,.eff. May 12. 2015. 
Notes of Decisions (41) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-3-107, UT ST§ 78B-3-107 
Current through 2016 Third Special Sessi<>n 
Eud of l)orumclU 
RULE 17. PARTIES PLAINTIFF ANO OEFENf?ANT, UT R RCP Rule 17 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
Part IV. Parties 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 17 
RULE 17. P • ..\.RTIES PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT 
Currentness 
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An executor, 
administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been 
made for the benefit of another. or a party authorized by statute may sue in that person's name without joining the party 
for whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall be 
brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name 
of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of 
the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification,joinder, or substitution shall 
have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest. 
{b) Minors or incompetent persons. An unemancipated minor or an insane or incompetent person who is a party must 
appear either by a general guardian or by a guardian ad litcm appointed in the particular case by the court in which the 
action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed in any case when it is deemed by the court in which the action 
or proceeding is prosecuted expedient to represent the minor, insane or incompetent person in the action or proceeding, 
notwithstanding that the person may have a general guardian and may have appeared by the guardian. In an action 
in rem it shall not be necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for any unknown party who might be a minor or an 
incompetent person. 
(c) Guardian ad litcm; bow appointed. A guardian ad litem appointed by a court must be appointed as follows: 
(c)(l) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of the minor, if the minor is of the age of fourteen years, or if 
under that age, upon the application of a relative or friend of the minor. 
(c)(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application of the minor if the minor is of the age of fourteen years and 
applies within 21 days after the service of the summons, or if under that age or if the minor neglects so to apply, then 
upon the application of a relative or friend of the minor, or of any other party to the action. 
(c)(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, upon motion therefor, shall be entitled to an order 
designating some suitable person to be guardian ad litem for the minor defendant, unless the def end ant or someone in 
behalf of the defendant within 21 days after service of notice of such motion shall cause to be appointed a guardian for 
such minor. Service of such notice may be made upon the defendant's general or testamentary guardian located in the 
defendant's state; if there is none, such notice, together with the summons in the action, shall be served in the manner 
provided for publication of summons upon such minor. if over fourteen years of age, or, if under fourteen years of age, 
-~ 
RULE 17. PARTIES PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT, UT R RCP Rule 17 
by such service on the person with whom the minor resides. The guardian ad litcm for such nonresident minor defendant 
shall have 21 days after appointment in which to plead to the action. 
(c)(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or proceeding, upon the application of a relative or 
friend of such insane or incompetent person. or of any other party to the action or proceeding. 
(d) Associates may sue or be sued by common name. When two or more persons associated in any business either as a 
joint-stock company, a partnership or other association. not a corporation, transact such business under a common 
name, whether it comprises the names of such associates or not, they may sue or be sued by such common name. Any 
judgment obtained against the association shall bind the joint property of all the associates in the same manner as if all 
had been named parties and had been sued upon their joint liability. The separate property of an individual member 
of the association may not be bound by the judgment unless the member is named as a party and the court acquires 
jurisdiction over the member. 
(e) Action against a nonresident doing business in this state. When a nonresident person is associated in and conducts 
business within the state of Utah in one or more places in that person's own name or a common trade name. and the 
business is conducted under the supervision of a manager, superintendent or agent the person may be sued in the person's 
name in any action arising out of the conduct of the business. 
(0 As used in these rules, the term plaintiff shall include a petitioner, and the term defendant shall include a respondent. 
Credits 
[Amended effective September 1, 1991; April 1, 1998; April 1, 2007; May 1, 2014.] 
Editors' Notes 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Paragraph (d) has been changed to conform to the holding in Cottomrnod Mall Co. 1·. Sin£'. 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988), 
which allows an unincorporated association to sue in its own name. The rule continues to allow an unincorporated 
association to be sued in its own name. The final sentence of paragraph (d) was added to confirm that the separate 
property of an individual member of an association may not be bound by the judgment unless the member is made a 
party. 
Technical changes in all paragraphs of the rule make the terminology gender neutral. In part (c) the word "minor" has 
replaced the word "infant," in order to maintain consistency with recent changes made in Rule 4(e)(2). In Rule 4 an 
infant is defined as a person under the age of 14 years, whereas the intent of Rule 17(c) is to include persons under the 
age of 18 years. 
Notes of Decisions (94) 
Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 17, UT R RCP Rule 17 
Current with amendments received through September 15, 2016. 
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